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John Molenaar1 
 
Executive summary 
Previous studies have examined the relation between accounting conservatism and 
earnings management. Those studies conclude that accounting conservatism reflected in 
earnings is explained mostly by the accrual component of earnings instead of the cash flow 
component (Roychowdhury and Watts, 2006 and Pae, 2007). To measure earnings 
management, the accrual component of earnings is often used. Because of the different 
nature of accruals at financial firms, in prior research, financial firms were not included 
into the samples (Pae, 2007, p. 688). This research introduces an approach to examine this 
relation for banks. The findings indicate that US bank managers use their discretion over 
loan loss provisions (large accruals for banks) to manage earnings and influence conditional 
accounting conservatism into the managements’ desired direction. 
 
For a full text copy of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5447. 
 
1. Introduction 
This research will introduce an approach to examine the relation between accounting 
conservatism and earnings management for banks. It provides empirical evidence about 
the contribution of bank managers’ discretionary accounting practices to conditional 
accounting conservatism. This research should answer to the question whether earnings 
management in the banking industry is counterbalanced by accounting conservatism. 
Therefore, the research question is: 
What is the association between conditional accounting conservatism and earnings 
management for the banking industry? 
                                             
1 John Molenaar graduated cum laude at the department of Accounting, Auditing and Control and is currently working as 
accountant at Grant Thornton. He is grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from supervisor E.A. de Knecht RA.  
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Moreover, this is an attempt to shed additional light on the accounting choices of bank 
managers related to accounting conservatism and earnings management. This could be an 
issue of empirical interest for this particular moment. The research could provide new 
insights into the period towards the economic crisis and the role of banks in this particular 
situation. 
 
This article starts in section 2.1 with the content of the term accounting conservatism in 
general and in the banking industry. Section 2.2 explains the theory behind earnings 
management. Section 2.3 presents an explanation of the relation between accounting 
conservatism and earnings management. Finally section 2 ends with prior research designs 
to measure conservatism and earnings management (section 2.4). The hypotheses are 
presented in section 3. The research design and methodology is presented in section 4. In 
order to answer the main research question, section 5 will provide empirical result and the 
research analysis. Finally, in section 6, the conclusions will be presented and the 
limitations and suggestions for further research will be commented. 
 
2. Prior literature 
2.1 Accounting conservatism 
Accounting conservatism is defined by Watts (2003, p. 208) as;”the differential verifiability 
required for recognition of profits versus losses. Its extreme form is the traditional 
conservatism adage: ‘anticipate no profit, but anticipate losses’”. This means that 
earnings are recognized when they are realized while losses are recognized immediately.  
 
Accounting conservatism could be divided into unconditional accounting conservatism and 
conditional accounting conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2005, p. 269-270). Unconditional 
accounting conservatism is referred to as ex-ante or news-independent. In this case, the 
book value of net assets is understated due to predetermined aspects (adopted accounting 
methods and policies) of the accounting process; this is why unconditional conservatism is 
also called balance-sheets conservatism. Conditional accounting conservatism is ex-post or 
news-dependent or also referred to as earnings conservatism. Conditional accounting 
conservatism refers to the application of accounting methods and policies that recognize 
bad news in earnings on a timelier basis that good news. Pae (2007, p. 684) explains the 
difference with two examples: 
 “Unconditional accounting conservatism include the immediate expensing of advertising 
and research and development expenditures, and the historical cost accounting for 
positive net present value projects (…) conditional accounting conservatism include the 
application of the lower of cost or market rule for inventory, the impairment test of long-
lived assets, and the asymmetric treatment of contingent losses versus contingent gains”. 
 
To investigate the use of conservatism empirically, the theoretical three-links framework 
(Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 1995 and Nichols and Wahlen, 2004) of linking 
accounting earnings to share prices could be used. The theory assumes that current 
accounting earnings provide information to develop expectations about future accounting 
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earnings. These current and expected future accounting earnings determine expected 
future dividends. Finally, the share price consists of the present value of all expected 
future dividends. This framework links theoretically, accounting earnings to firm value.  
 
Basu (1997, p. 3) uses this framework to link accounting earnings with share prices in order 
to measure conditional accounting conservatism. He interprets conservatism as accounting 
earnings reflecting 'bad news' (measured by negative stock returns) more quickly than 'good 
news' (measured by positive stock returns). Consequently, he documents that bad news in 
earnings are recognized on a timelier basis than good news. Pope and Walker (1999, p. 54) 
extend Basu’s observations by developing new measures of conservatism by examining both 
earnings before extraordinary items and after extraordinary items.  
 
Nichols et al (2008) investigate the subject of implications of conditional conservatism in 
bank accounting. Consistent with Liu and Ryan (1995, p. 78), Nichols et al. (2008, p. 90-91) 
use loan loss provisions relative to changes in non-performing loans as a measure for 
conservatism at banks. Several dimensions of loan loss accounting at banks reflect banks’ 
credit risk management, which is an important element for the profitability. Moreover, 
loan loss accounting has a material effect on income statement items and on the balance 
sheet and captures a substantial degree of management estimations. Consequently, 
looking at loan loss accounting should be the way to investigate preferences for 
conservatism, according to Nichols (2008, p. 91).  
 
2.2 Earnings management 
Ronen and Yaari (2008, p. 26) present a formal definition2 of earnings management: 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”. 
 
In previous literature, earnings management is also referred to as accounts manipulation. 
Accounts manipulation is mainly due to the desire of management to influence the wealth 
transfers between the various stakeholders (Stolowy and Breton, 2004, p. 6). Stolowy and 
Breton describe a model (2004, p. 7-8) in which possibilities of wealth transfers between 
several stakeholders are outlined. The stakeholders involved in this model are the company 
itself, society, fund providers and managers. Depending on the actions of the manager, the 
firm or the manager benefits from the wealth transfer.  
 
Previous studies regarding earnings management at banks measure earnings management, 
consistent with conservatism, via loan loss provisions (single accounting item approach) 
because these are relatively large accruals for commercial banks3 (Ahmed et al., 1999, p. 
2). Beaver and Engel (1996, p. 178) divide loan loss accounting in a discretionary and 
                                             
2 Derived from Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368). 
3 Accruals are a measure for earnings management. 
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nondiscretionary part. They find that the discretionary part of loan loss provisions is 
positively related to earnings, which means that banks do use loan loss provisions to 
manage earnings. Cornett et al. (2006, p. 10-11) conclude that, as the level of bad loans 
increases (= non-discretionary), managers do not record discretionary loan losses because 
it would decrease the bank’s income even more, which implies bank managers to use 
discretionary loan loss provisions to manage earnings. Another implication for earnings 
management is that the use of discretionary loan loss provisions to increase earnings is 
significantly related to the fraction of shares owned by the banks managers. 
 
2.3 General relation between accounting conservatism and earnings management  
According to Watts (2003), opportunistic financial reporting is counterbalanced by 
accounting conservatism. Regarding information asymmetry, there is a need for verifiable 
accounting reports. Given the asymmetric information and payoffs between several parties 
involved, conservatism should, in theory, aid in efficient contracting between the firm and 
its stakeholders. Pae (2007, p. 685) explains that due to higher litigation costs, managers 
have incentives to understate earnings by expediting the recognition of bad news rather 
than good news. Management’s discretion over accruals in that case leads to an increase in 
the level of accounting conservatism. On the other hand, the bonus incentive for managers 
leads to postponing or hiding bad news to achieve their bonus-plan goals. This will 
decrease the level of earnings conservatism. Consequently, in theory, the relation between 
earnings management and accounting conservatism is that opportunistic financial reporting 
is counterbalanced by accounting conservatism. 
 
García Lara et al. (2005) investigate empirically the effects of earnings management on 
accounting conservatism directly. This relation is measured using the Basu (1997) model to 
measure conservatism and the Jones (1991) model to measure earnings management by 
partitioning total accruals in discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006) study the relation between conditional accounting conservatism and 
earnings management also by investigating the role of accruals on the asymmetric 
timeliness of the recognition of gains and losses. They conclude that there is a major role 
for accounting accruals in recognizing gains and losses more timely, so before actual cash 
flow is realized and that, consistent with Basu (1997), accrued loss recognition is more 
prevalent than accrued gain recognition. 
 
Pae (2007, p. 685) explains that, on one hand, managers have incentives to understate 
earnings by expediting the recognition of bad news and on the other hand, the bonus 
incentive is to postpone or hide bad news that will decrease the level of conditional 
conservatism. He tests empirically the impact of earnings management on conservatism. 
Pae (2007, p. 685) decomposes total accruals into non-discretionary (expected) and 
discretionary (unexpected) components and examines the relative contribution of 
expected and unexpected accruals to conditional accounting conservatism. Pae’s results 
suggest that conditional accounting conservatism is primarily linked to the discretionary 
(managed) part of accruals rather than non-discretionary (unmanaged) accruals. 
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2.4 Prior research designs 
2.4.1 Measuring accounting conservatism 
Basu (1997, p. 290) measures conditional accounting conservatism by using the asymmetric 
standards for the verification of losses and gains which causes bad news (negative stock 
returns) to be more reflected in current earnings than good news (positive stock returns). 
 
Nichols et al. (2008, p. 110-111) examines conservatism in the banking industry using loan 
loss provisions. Loan loss provisions are accrued expenses that are estimates of changes in 
expected future losses in the loan portfolio due to credit risk. Loan loss provisions reduce 
the net loans on the balance sheet and these loan loss provisions consequently increases 
loan loss allowances (which reflect the total amount of expected future loan losses).  
 
Nichols et al. (2008, p. 111) state that the asymmetric timeliness of news reflected in 
earnings changes is traced to conservatism in several earnings components. Change in net 
income is decomposed in two parts: (1) change in earnings before loan loss provisions and 
(2) change in loan loss provisions. The focus of the regression analysis is on the persistence 
of change in loan loss provisions. An indication for conditional conservatism is that bad 
news about credit losses is assumed to have lower persistence and good news should have 
higher persistence. 
 
2.4.2 Measuring earnings management 
Because accruals are relatively large items that are subject to management’s discretion, 
according to Healy (1985), and McNichols (2000), accruals are often used as a measure of 
earnings management. To measure earnings management, the development of accruals 
over a particular period is investigated. If management uses its discretion over accruals, 
for example, by overstating its accruals in the first period, the second period should, due 
to the nature of accruals, present a correction on this by a significant decrease in accruals.  
 
A generally used approach in earnings management literature is the Jones model. 
Conceptually, total accruals (TACC) are decomposed into non-discretionary (NDACC) and 
discretionary accruals (DACC). The difference between total accruals and non-
discretionary accruals is the discretionary component. In other words, discretionary 
accruals are the prediction error in the Jones (1991) accruals model. 
 
Jones uses a two-step approach. First, a cross-sectional regression is performed for total 
accruals (TACC). Total accruals (TACC) are measured as the change in non-cash working 
capital plus depreciation and amortization4. Jones then regress total accruals on the 
change in sales and property, plant and equipment. 
(1) TACCt/TAt-1 = β0 (1/TAt-1) + β0 (∆REVt/TAt-1) + β2 (PPEt/TAt-1) + εt 
                                             
4 TACC = ∆(CA-CASH) - ∆(CL-CBORR) – (DEP+INT). CA is total current assets, CASH is total cash and equivalents, CL is current 
liabilities, CBORR is borrowings repayable within 1 year, DEP is depreciation, and INT is amounts written off intangibles. 
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Where TA is total assets, ∆REV is the change in revenue and PPE is property, plant and 
equipment. ∆REV and PPE control for the non-discretionary part of total accruals since 
those items are associated with changes in operating activity and level of depreciation. 
 
The second step is to use these industry-year parameter estimates from the previous 
equation (1) to divide the total accruals into a discretionary part (DACC) and a non-
discretionary part (NDACC). Non-discretionary accruals (NDACC) are the predicted part of 
total accruals and discretionary accruals (DACC) are the residual resulting from this 
regression. 
(2) DACCt = TACCt/TAt-1 - NDACCt 
(3) DACCt = TACCt/TAt-1 – [B0 (1/ TAt-1) + B1 (∆REVt /TAt-1) + B2 (PPEt/ TAt-1)] 
B0, B1 and B2 are the industry-year parameter estimated in regression (1). 
 
According to prior literature, bank’s earnings changes could be decomposed into changes 
in earnings before loan loss provisions and changes in loan loss provisions. Since loan loss 
provisions have a relatively large discretionary impact on earnings, loan loss provisions is 
used to measure earnings management (Nichols et al., 2008, p. 111).  
 
Ahmed et al. (1999, p. 11-12) regress loan loss provisions, amongst others, on changes in 
non-performing loans divided by average loans outstanding and earnings before taxes and 
loan provisions divided by average total asset, because these are relatively 
nondiscretionary components, following the approach of Nichols et al. (2006, p. 113). By 
doing this, the discretionary components of loan loss provisions can be distilled. Because 
loan loss provisions have a discretionary part, which is subject to management’s 
estimations and judgments (Liu and Ryan, 1995, p. 80), earnings management can be 
measured by examining the relation between earnings and loan loss provisions. 
 
2.4.3 Measuring the relation between accounting conservatism and earnings 
management 
Pae (2007, p. 686), Garia Lara et al. (2005, p. 704) and Roychowdhury and Watts (2007, p. 
10) expect, according to Basu (1997), the asymmetric standards for the verification of 
losses and gains to cause bad news (negative stock returns) to be more reflected in current 
earnings than good news (positive stock returns). This principle is expressed in the 
following regression (Basu, 1997): 
(4) Et / Pt-1 = α + βRt + ηD + γRtD + εt 
Et is annual earnings per share, Pt-1 is the beginning-of-fiscal-year market value of equity, 
Rt is concurrent stock returns, and RtD is an indicator variable that equals one if Rt is 
negative and zero if Rt is positive. According to the Basu (1997) model, β measures the 
response of earnings to positive returns, while (β + γ) measures the response when returns 
are negative. As stated before, conservatism means that earnings reflect 'bad news' more 
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quickly than 'good news' implying that (β + γ) > β, which means that γ > 0. Basu (1997) 
calls γ the asymmetric timeliness coefficient.  
 
Pae (2007, p. 686-687) and García Lara et al. (2005, p. 706-708) state that the relative 
contribution of earnings components or the relative contribution of expected (non-
discretionary) and unexpected (discretionary) accruals to conditional accounting 
conservatism, reflected in earnings, could be inferred by substituting earnings components 
for Et in regression (4). In this case, respectively CFt for cash flows, ACCt for accruals, or 
non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. By doing this, the effect of earnings 
management can be determined since accruals is the measure for earnings management, in 
particular discretionary accruals. These non-discretionary and discretionary accruals are 
estimated from the Jones (1991) model. 
 
The differential timeliness of earnings and earnings components is estimated by a 
regression of earnings and its components, cash flows and its accruals (expected and 
unexpected), on concurrent stock returns (Pea, 2007, p. 691). The level of conditional 
accounting is measured by the coefficient estimate γ, which indicates the timeliness of 
earnings and its components, between bad news and good news. Earnings management is 
measured by the ratio of γ for accruals and discretionary accruals to earnings. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
After the previously enumerated and explained theory and empirical literature, hypothesis 
regarding the relation between conditional accounting conservatism and earnings 
management can be developed. 
 
As commented in the previous section, Basu (1997) uses the rate of stock returns to find 
evidence of the existence of accounting conservatism reflected in earnings at non-financial 
US firms. He documents that bad news in earnings are recognized on a timelier basis than 
good news. Extending this conclusion to the banking industry results in the expectation of 
existence of earnings conservatism in the banking industry as well. Moreover, Nichols et al. 
(2008) concludes that banks use conditional conservatism as well. This hypothesis is 
strengthened by the conclusion of Nichols at al. (2008) that publicly traded banks exhibit a 
greater degree of conditional accounting conservatism. This implies a greater chance of 
concluding existence of conservatism at publicly traded banks. 
 H1:  
 Conditional accounting conservatism does exist in the banking industry. 
Beatty et al. (1995, p. 249) finds that the discretionary part of loan loss provisions is 
positively related to earnings, which means that banks do use loan loss provisions to 
manage earnings. On the other hand, Watts (2003) states that, to achieve efficient 
contracting a demand exists for verifiable accounting reports. Based on the asymmetric 
information and payoffs between several contracting parties, the use of accounting 
conservatism should aid in efficient contracting between the firm and its stakeholders. 
Consequently, there is a need to limit opportunistic (biased) reporting by firms. 
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Pae (2007, p. 685) explains that due to higher litigation costs, managers have incentives to 
understate earnings by expediting the recognition of bad news than good news which leads 
to an increase of the level of accounting conservatism. The bonus incentive for managers 
leads on the other hand to postponing or hiding bad news to achieve their bonus-plan 
targets that decrease the level of earnings conservatism.  
 
Since earnings management is measured via discretionary loan loss provisions, the 
hypothesis regarding the relation between earnings management and earnings 
conservatism is that opportunistic financial reporting using loan loss provisions is 
counterbalanced by accounting conservatism. 
 H2:  
Discretionary loan loss provisions do not contribute to conditional accounting conservatism 
reflected in earnings. 
 
4. Research design 
In this section, the methodology used for the empirical part of this research is presented 
and explained. The first part will introduce the type of research. Then the research model 
is explained. Finally, the data sample used for this research is presented. 
 
4.1 Type of research 
According to Baarda and de Goede (2001, p. 90) an examination-based, or also as referred 
to evaluative research, should be performed to research with the previously described 
objective. Because, to investigate expectations and relations between different concepts, 
the expectations should be tested by comparing related theory and empirical data. This 
means that, to begin with, expectations should be expressed in one or more hypotheses. 
These hypotheses are based on related theory and previous (empirical) literature (Baarda 
and de Goede. 2001, p. 91). During the research, the hypotheses are tested with empirical 
data. The aim is to investigate whether the hypothesis are true or false. Based on the 
comparison of the hypothesis with empirical data conclusions can be drawn. Verschuren en 
Doorewaard (2007, p. 292) state that examination-based research is often used for 
empirical investigation. According to them, this kind research is quantitative because 
particular numerical relations are being investigated, also referred to as statistical 
research. Therefore, statistical methods should be used in order to conclude whether the 
hypotheses are empirically significant5. 
                                             
5 Statistical significant means that the probability that your conclusions are based on coincidence is lower that 1%, 5% or 10% 
(Baarda and de Goede, 2001, p. 371). 
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4.2 Research model 
4.2.1 Conditional accounting conservatism 
To determine the existence of the conditional conservatism reflected in earnings, the Basu 
(1997) model is used, consistent with García Lara et al. (2005) and Pae (2007). Conditional 
accounting conservatism (according to Basu 1997) is the timeliness of earnings with respect 
to stock returns and is inferred based on the regression in the previous sections: 
(1) Et / Pt-1 = α + βRt + ηD + γRtD + εt 
As explained before, the β parameter measures the response of earnings to positive 
returns, while (β + γ) measures the response when returns are negative. Conditional 
conservatism, consistent with García Lara et al. (2005) and Pae (2007), is interpreted as 
earnings reflecting 'bad news' on a timelier basis than 'good news'. This means that the 
coefficient estimates for bad news (β + γ) should be higher than the coefficient for good 
news β. This implies that if earnings conservatism exists, γ should be greater than zero6. 
Consequently, γ is the asymmetric timeliness coefficient. 
 
To measure the association between conditional conservatism and earnings management 
the Basu (1997) model will be used again (García Lara et al., 2005 and Pae, 2007) but loan 
loss provisions (LLP) is distilled as a separate earnings component (Nichols et al., 2008, p. 
111). In order to measure the association between that earnings component which is 
expected to be managed, the disentangling loan loss provisions are necessary. This 
component is, according to previously described literature, the loan loss provisions. The 
regression to measure the contribution of the loan loss provisions component to level of 
conditional accounting conservatism is the following.  
(2) LLPt / Pt-1  = α + βRt + ηD + γRtD + εt 
Consistent with Pae (2007, p. 691-692) and the content of the previous paragraph, the 
degree of conditional earnings conservatism is measured by γ, the difference in timeliness 
of earnings, or its components, between bad news and good news.  
 
4.2.2. Earnings management 
According to the Jones model (1991), to disentangle the effect of earnings management a 
cross-sectional regression on the total loan loss provisions (LLP) will be executed. In the 
first step, total loan loss provisions (LLP) are estimated, consistent with Nichols et al. 
(2008, p. 113-114), by the following regression model: 
(3) LLPt = β0 + β1NPLt + β2NCOt + β3LLAt + β4HOMPt + β5CAPRATt + εt 
NPL are the non-performing loans and NCO is the net charge-offs. LLA is loan loss 
allowances, HOMP is the homogeneous loans (family loans plus consumer loans), and 
                                             
6  If (β + γ) > β, then γ > 0. 
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CAPRAT is the tier one risk based capital ratio7. According to Nichols et al., (2008, p. 114) 
managers’ expectations of loan losses (which are reflected in loan loss provisions) are 
based on delinquent loans (NPL). Loan loss provisions are also related to loan charge-offs 
(NCO), which are realized loan losses.  
 
According to Ryan (2007), it is expected that high LLAt imply lower loan loss provisions 
because of over-reservation. Liu and Ryan (2006) state that banks with higher HOMPt have 
lower loan loss provisions because; “banks recognize provisions for these types of loans in 
the first year using statistical methods to estimate future loan losses, resulting in lower 
provisions later in the lives of these loans”. In order to absorb potential loan losses, banks 
with greater credit risk in the loan portfolio maintain higher capitalization levels, implying 
a positive relation between CAPRATt and LLPt. These last three variables (LLAt HOMPt, and 
CAPRATt) are included to control for differences in expected loan loss provisions across 
banks (Nichols, 2008, p. 114). 
 
Because it is assumed that, on average, there is no earnings management in the industry as 
a whole, for the second step following the Jones (1991) model, these industry-year 
parameter estimates from equation (3) are used to divide the LLP into a discretionary part 
(DLLP) and a non-discretionary part (NDLLP). NDLLP is the predicted8 part of LLP and DLLP 
is the residual resulting in this regression: 
(4) NDLLPt = B0 + B1NPLt + B2NCOt + B3LLAt + B4HOMPt + B5CAPRATt  
(5) DLLPt = LLPt - NDLLPt 
 DLLPt = LLPt – [B0 + B1NPLt + B2NCOt + B3LLAt + B4HOMPt + B5CAPRATt] 
B0, B1, B2,, B3,, B4 and B5 are the estimated parameters in the regression (3).  
 
4.2.3 Conditional accounting conservatism and earnings management  
To determine the ratio of the part of the conditional accounting conservatism that is 
explained by the discretionary component of the loan loss provisions (DLLP) and the part 
explained by the non-discretionary part of the loan loss provisions (NDLLP), an analysis will 
performed on the differential timeliness parameter NDLLP and on DLLP (regression 6 and 
7).  
(6) NDLLPt = α + βRt + ηD + γRtD + εt 
(7) DLLPt = α + βRt + ηD + γRtD + εt 
This last step is to measure the contribution of earnings management to conditional 
accounting conservatism. On the next page, in the figure an overview is presented of the 
structure of this research.
                                             
7 The capital ratio is the percentage of a bank's capital to its risk-weighted assets. 
8 Predicted by regression (3). 
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4.3  Data sample 
The data used in this research will come from data of annual stock returns, accounting 
earnings, and loan loss provisions of 218 listed1 banks in the United States for the period of 
2000 to 2007. Datastream provides the data of annual stock prices. For the other data, the 
Bankscope database is used. Bankscope contains financial information of over 28,000 banks 
worldwide and captures balance sheet data and income and expenses as well as ratios and 
other annual financial data. 
 
Table 4.1 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full Sample - 1.962 Observations      
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation First Quartile Median Third Quartile 
MV 3.486,51 20.487,14 88,35 196,34 608,41 
R 0,094 0,307 -0,086 0,062 0,241 
E 0,076 0,041 0,059 0,072 0,091 
LLP 0,019 0,030 0,006 0,011 0,022 
Notes:     
MV =  Market value of common equity.    
R = Annual stock returns for the fiscal year.    
E =  Net income deflated by beginning-of-the-year market value of common equity MV. 
LLP =  Loan loss provisions deflated by beginning-of-the-year market value of common equity 
(MV)
Panel B: Full Sample - 1.962 Observations      
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation First Quartile Median
Third 
Quartile 
LLP 87,42 707,94 0,80 2,28 6,88 
NCO 81,82 632,06 0,43 1,48 5,80 
HOMP 10.458,30 58.232,12 419,37 833,04 2.287,32 
NPL 89,88 628,86 1,41 4,20 13,79 
LLA 168,10 1.014,57 5,00 10,40 30,49 
TL 10.292,14 57.243,53 536,72 1.033,90 2.725,93 
TA 21.470,26 138.273,65 650,57 1.244,90 3.260,55 
CAPRAT 12,20 3,81 10,20 11,60 13,00 
Notes: All in mln. $  
LLP = Loan loss provisions.   
NCO = Net charge-offs.   
HOMP = The amount of consumer loans.   
NPL = Non-performing loans.   
LLA = Loan loss allowances.   
TL = Total liabilities.   
TA =  Total assets.   
CAPRAT = The Tier 1 Capital ratio.    
 
                                             
1  According to Nichols et al. (2008, p. 113) public banks use greater conditional accounting conservatism. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Conditional accounting conservatism 
Conditional accounting conservatism is measured by the difference in timeliness of 
earnings between bad news (negative stock returns) and good news (positive stock 
returns). This is expressed by the coefficient estimate on RtD, which is γ. Table 1 presents 
the regression results of this measure. 
Table 5.1 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
 Basu measure  
Dependent variable γ Sig.
E -0,124 0,000
Notes:   
E = Net income. 
As presented in the table, γ the mean differential timeliness estimate of earnings (E) from 
the regression is -0.124, which is significant at the 0.01 level. This indicates that the 
timeliness of bad news, represented as negative stock returns, is less than the timeliness 
of good news, represented in positive stock returns. Because γ is smaller than zero, 
accounting earnings reflect bad news less quickly than good news, which means that bad 
news is recognized in earnings on a less timely basis than good news. Consequently, the 
conclusion would be that US banks were not conservative in the period of 2000 to 2007 and 
the first hypothesis should be declined. There is no conditional accounting conservatism in 
the banking industry in the period 2000 to 2007. 
 
Because loan loss provisions is the earnings component that is expected to be managed, 
measuring the association between the conditional conservatism and earnings 
management, loan loss provisions are disentangled. The Basu (1997) model is re-run but 
accounting earnings (E) is substituted by its component loan loss provisions (LLP). 
Table 5.2 
Asymmetric timeliness of loan loss provisions 
  Basu measure  
Dependent variable γ Sig.
LLP -0,020 0,068
Notes:   
LLP = Loan loss provisions. 
Again, γ is smaller than zero that means that loan loss provisions reflect bad news less 
quickly than good news. Consequently, the conclusion would be that in the researched 
period, US banks were not conservative regarding their loan loss provisions.  
 
The non-conservative accounting policies can also be pointed out in the development of 
loan loss provisions in the period 2000 to 2007. 
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Table 5.3 
Development of loan loss provisions 
Year Average LLP Average NPL LLP / NPL
2000 55 76 0,724
2001 95 98 0,969
2002 107 119 0,899
2003 78 97 0,804
2004 66 81 0,815
2005 84 67 1,254
2006 83 71 1,169
2007 180 148 1,216
Notes:   
LLP = Loan loss provisions. 
NPL =  Non-performing loans. 
 
Figure 5.1 
Development of loan loss provisions 
 
 15
Figure 5.2 
Development of loan loss provisions  
related to non performing loans 
 
As presented in table 3 and in figure 1, in 2007 the average loan loss provisions 
significantly increased. This is an indication that the reported loan loss provisions in 
previous years were too low and that there was a need to correct for that in 2007. Another 
indication for earnings management, as shown in figure 2, is that in the period of 2000 to 
2004, the average reported provisions where less than 100% of the average non-performing 
loans. This trend reversed in the period of 2005 to 2007 where the average reported loan 
loss provisions where more than 100% of the non-performing loans, which is again an 
indication for a correction on the previous period. These corrections are an indication for 
earnings management as referred to by McNichols (2000) and explained in section 2. 
 
Because of using earnings management this non-conservative behaviour is expected. In the 
next sections, the influence of earnings management will be further investigated. 
 
5.2 Discretionary loan loss provisions and conditional accounting conservatism 
To disentangle the effect of earnings management the Jones model (1991) is used in order 
to determine which part of loan loss provisions is non-discretionary and which part is 
discretionary (managed). To recall the regression formula to estimate loan loss provisions: 
LLPt = β0 + β1NPLt + β2NCOt + β3LLAt + β4HOMPt + β5CAPRATt + εt 
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Table 5.4 
Parameter estimates of LLP 
Variable   Coefficient Sig.
Constant B0 -28,715 0,036
NPL B3 0,38 0,000
NCO B1 0,673 0,000
LLA B4 -0,135 0,000
HOMP B2 0,003 0,000
CAPRAT B5 1,516 0,152
Notes:    
NCO = Net charge-offs. 
HOMP =  Consumer loans. 
NPL =  Non-performing loans. 
LLA =  Loan loss allowances. 
CAPRAT =  The Tier 1 Capital ratio. 
Table 4 shows the parameter estimations of LLP resulting from the regression. According to 
the Jones (1991) model, these estimations determine what LLP should be, non-
discretionary, not managed. This means that the discretionary, managed, part of LLP is the 
difference between the reported LLP and the estimated LLP from the regression. According 
to this regression and its estimated parameters, the amount of non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions can be expressed in the following formula: 
NDLLPt = -28,715 + 0,38*NPLt + 0,673*NCOt - 0,135*LLAt + 0,003*HOMPt + 1,156*CAPRATt  
Next, an analysis will be performed on the non-discretionary loan loss provisions and the 
differences between the reported loan loss provisions. 
In table 5, the average reported loan loss provisions (LLP) and the non-discretionary loan 
loss provisions (NLLP), resulting from the Jones regression, are presented. 
Table 5.5 
Reported and non-discretionary 
loan loss provisions 
    Average
NDLLP  93,46
LLP  87,42
DLLP  6,04
Notes:   
NDLLP =  Non-discretionary loan loss provisions. 
LLP =  Loan loss provisions. 
DLLP = Discretionary Loan loss provisions. 
Table 5 shows that the average reported loan loss provisions are lower than the 
expectation of loan loss provisions based on the regression (NDLLP). Consequently, because 
the reported loan loss provisions are lower than they should be this is an indication for not 
being conservative as well. Consequently, the conclusion, in accordance with the previous 
section, is that banks manage loan loss provisions downwards. This downward manipulation 
is not conservative. 
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5.3 Timeliness of discretionary and non-discretionary loan loss provisions 
By decomposing loan loss provisions into discretionary and non-discretionary components, 
earnings management would be reflected in discretionary loan loss provisions. Earnings 
management could be understatement of expenses and overstatement of gains but 
unnecessary overstatement of expenses and understatement of gains as well. 
 
An analysis is done on the differential timeliness parameter NDLLP and DLLP to determine 
the which part of conditional accounting conservatism is explained by the discretionary 
(managed) component of loan loss provisions (DLLP) and the part explained by the non-
discretionary (unmanaged) part of loan loss provisions (NDLLP).  
Table 5.6 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, loan loss provisions and 
non-discretionary and discretionary loan loss provisions 
 Basu measure
Dependent variable γ Sig.
E -0,124 0,000
LLP -0,020 0,068
NDLLP 0,120 0,002
DLLP -0,140 0,001
Notes:   
E =  Net income. 
LLP =  Loan loss provisions. 
NDLLP =  Non-discretionary loan loss provisions. 
DLLP =  Discretionary loan loss provisions. 
Table 6 shows that 16% (-0,020/-0,124) of the differential timeliness of earnings with 
respect to earnings is explained by the loan loss provisions component of earnings. The rest 
of the table shows averages of the differential timeliness estimates of the non-
discretionary (NDLLP) and discretionary parts of loan loss provisions (DLLP). Consistent 
with Pae (2007, p. 692), the sum of the differential timeliness of non-discretionary and 
discretionary loan loss provisions is the differential timeliness of loan loss provisions.  
 
The average differential timeliness of discretionary loan loss provisions is -0,140. This 
indicates that discretionary loan loss provisions reflect bad news less quickly than good 
news, which means that bad news is recognized in discretionary loan loss provisions on a 
timelier basis than good news. The average differential timeliness of non-discretionary 
loan loss provisions is 0,120, which means that bad news is recognized in non-discretionary 
loan loss provisions on a timelier basis than good news. This all indicates that the part of 
loan loss provisions managers have discretion over, is managed into a non-conservative 
direction. The part of loan loss provisions managers cannot use their discretion is 
conservative. Consequently, the second hypothesis should be accepted; earnings 
management does not contribute to conservatism but is decreases conservatism. 
 
Summarizing, when loan loss provisions are decomposed in a discretional and in a non-
discretional part, the discretional part is managed non-conservative and in the non-
discretionary part, conservatism is practiced. According to section 6.1.2 in 2007, the 
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average amount of loan loss provisions significantly increases. In the next section will be 
investigated what the influence of this increase is to the level of conservatism in the year 
2007. 
 
5.4 The year 2007 
As presented in table 7, γ the mean differential timeliness estimate of earnings (E) from 
the regression is 0.142, indicating that the timeliness of bad news for 2007 is higher than 
the timeliness of good news. This means that for 2007, in contrary to the average of period 
2000 to 2007, bad news is recognized in earnings on a timelier basis than good news. The 
conclusion for 2007 would be that US banks were conservative in that particular year. This 
is consistent with the expectations of section 7.1.2 which presented that the amount of 
loan loss provisions significantly increased in 2007 in order to correct for non-conservative 
accounting practice in the period before. 
Table 5.7 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, loan loss provisions and 
non-discretionary and discretionary loan loss provisions 
 Basu measure
Dependent variable γ Sig.
E 0,142 0,502
LLP 0,073 0,505
NPLLP 0,033 0,828
DLLP 0,040 0,742
Notes:   
E =  Net income. 
LLP =  Loan loss provisions. 
NDLLP =  Non-discretionary loan loss provisions. 
DLLP =  Discretionary loan loss provisions. 
The rest of table 7 shows the earnings component loan loss provision decomposed into 
discretionary and non-discretionary part. 51,4% (0.073/0.142) of the differential timeliness 
of earnings is explained by the differential timeliness of loan loss provisions. For LLP, γ is 
now greater than zero that means that also loan loss provisions reflect bad news more 
quickly than good news in 2007. Consequently, for LLP the conclusion for 2007 would also 
be that US banks were conservative regarding their loan loss provisions.  
 
The average differential timeliness of discretionary loan loss provisions for 2007 is 0,040. 
This means that bad news is recognized in discretionary loan loss provisions on a timelier 
basis than good news. The average differential timeliness of non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions is now 0,033, consequently in 2007 bad news is recognized in non-discretionary 
loan loss provisions on a timelier basis than good news.  
 
The above results of 2007 indicates that the part of loan loss provisions managers have 
discretion over, is in 2007, in contrary with the period 2000 to 2007, managed into a 
conservative direction. The part of loan loss provisions managers cannot use their 
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discretion is conservative as well. Consequently, the conclusion would be that due to non-
conservative behaviour, which is practiced by using earnings management regarding loan 
loss provisions, US bank managers had to correct for that in 2007 where the average 
amount of loan loss provisions increased significantly. This resulted in a conservative year 
2007. These results and conclusions are consistent with the conclusions of McNichols (2000) 
and as explained in section 2. 
 
6. Conclusions, limitations and recommendation for further research 
6.1 Conclusions 
Conditional accounting conservatism is measured by the difference in timeliness of 
earnings between bad news and good news. The results of previously performed research 
indicates that the timeliness of bad news, represented as negative stock returns, is less 
than the timeliness of good news, represented in positive stock returns. The conclusion 
was that US banks were not conservative in the period of 2000 to 2007. In other words, 
there was no conditional accounting conservatism in the banking industry in the period 
2000 to 2007. 
 
Loan loss provisions are the earnings component that is expected to be managed. 
Therefore, in order to measure the association between the conditional conservatism and 
earnings management, loan loss provisions are disentangled and measured in relation with 
conditional accounting conservatism. The results show that loan loss provisions reflect bad 
news less quickly than good news. This means that US banks were not conservative in the 
period of 2000 to 2007 regarding their loan loss provisions.   
 
By decomposing loan loss provisions into discretionary and non-discretionary components 
(NDLLP), earnings management would be reflected in discretionary loan loss provisions 
(DLLP). The analysis on the differential timeliness parameters NDLLP and DLLP determined 
which part of conditional accounting conservatism is explained by the discretionary 
(managed) component of loan loss provisions and the part explained by the non-
discretionary (unmanaged) part of loan loss provisions.  
 
The average differential timeliness of discretionary loan loss provisions indicated that 
discretionary loan loss provisions reflect bad news less quickly than good news, which 
means that bad news is recognized in discretionary loan loss provisions on a timelier basis 
than good news. The average differential timeliness of non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions is indicated that bad news is recognized in non-discretionary loan loss provisions 
on a timelier basis than good news. Consequently, the conclusion is that the part of loan 
loss provisions managers have discretion over, is managed non-conservative direction and 
the part of loan loss provisions managers cannot use their discretion is conservative.  
 
This conclusion is strengthened by the findings in the development of loan loss provisions 
in the period 2000 to 2007. In 2007, the average loan loss provisions significantly increased 
which indicated that the reported loan loss provisions in previous years were too low and 
 20 
that there was a need to correct for that in 2007. Another indication for earnings 
management is that in the period of 2000 to 2004, the average reported provisions where 
less than 100% of the average non-performing loans. This trend reversed in the period of 
2005 to 2007 where the average reported loan loss provisions where more than 100% of the 
non-performing loans, which is again an indication for a correction on the previous period. 
This reversion is an indication for earnings management as referred to in theory and 
empirical literature. 
 
Investigating the year 2007 separately, indicates that the part of loan loss provisions 
managers have discretion over, is in contrary with the period 2000 to 2007, managed into a 
conservative direction. The part of loan loss provisions managers cannot use their 
discretion is conservative as well. This means that due to non-conservative behaviour, 
which is practiced by using earnings management regarding loan loss provisions, US bank 
managers had to correct for that behaviour in 2007. This resulted in a conservative year 
2007.  
 
According to the previous findings, the main research question could be answered. The 
main research question was, according to the introduction: 
What is the association between conditional accounting conservatism and earnings 
management for the banking industry? 
When loan loss provisions are decomposed in a discretional and in a non-discretional part, 
the part of loan loss provisions managers have discretion over, is managed into a non-
conservative direction. The part of loan loss provisions managers cannot use their 
discretion is conservative. Consequently, the conclusion is that US bank managers use their 
discretion over loan loss provisions to manage earnings and influence conditional 
accounting conservatism into the managements’ desired direction. 
 
6.2 Limitations and recommendation for further research 
This research examines the relation between accounting conservatism and earnings 
management. Consistent with prior research, loan loss provisions are used to measure 
earnings management because of the relatively large discretionary approach that is due to 
estimations of bank managers. During the recent credit crisis, banks played an important 
role by valuating their assets at fair value. Afterwards, it can be concluded that this fair 
value approach might not have been sufficient to present a true and fair view of the 
financial situation of the particular banks. Consequently, a limitation of this research could 
be the use of loan loss provisions to measure earnings management regarding banks. As 
seen in the results of this research, earnings components other than loan loss provisions 
could influence conservatism as well. The development of the credit crunch can put its 
light on other methods of earnings management used by bank managers. An example could 
be the use and valuation of special purpose vehicles. Moreover, financial instruments, in 
particular the qualification of these instruments, could be a method of earnings 
management used by bank managers as well. Nevertheless, identifying earning 
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management regarding the credit crunch is still very difficult. Many institutions do not 
have a proper explanation for what have happened and how it could have happened.  
 
Therefore, further research can build on the possible limitation of using loan loss 
provisions as a measure of earnings management. New measures can be developed, maybe 
determined after the credit crunch is finished and it is clear what other methods bank 
managers used to manage earnings, causing the credit crisis. 
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